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Modelling Global Demographic Change: 
Results for Japan 
 
Abstract 
In earlier papers (McKibbin and Nguyen (2001, (2002)) we introduced demographic features 
into the MSG3 model of the world economy, following the approach of Bryant and 
McKibbin (2001).  In this paper we use the same theoretical technique to develop a series of 
models based on a consistent database from a simple two country symmetric theoretical 
model to the complete 4 country MSG3 model, which represents the empirical characteristics 
of Japan, United States, Rest of OECD and Rest of World. We explore a stylized decline in 
fertility similar to that experienced by Japan since the 1950 (exactly the same shock as the 
stylized shock used in Bryant (2004)). We first explore the properties of the theoretical model 
with both a global and a single country shock. This gives similar results to that found in the 
basic framework underlying the Bryant (2004) approach. We then move from the simplest 
fully optimizing framework to increasing add complexity to the model until we build a model 
of Japan. We explore the same shock across the models of increasing complexity in this paper 
and compare our results to the Bryant approach. We find that although the basic insights from 
the sequences of theoretical papers in the Brooking-ANU project continue to hold, the 
quantitative results change significantly as the model is adapted to have more characteristics 
of Japan.  
In a final section, we use the complete model to explore the likely impacts on Japan of the 
demographic change already experienced from 1970 and look to the likely changes to be 
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Many countries in the world economy are undergoing significant demographic change, or 
are projected to over coming decades.  Table 1 illustrates the expected changes in old age 
dependency ratios of a number of countries between 2000 and 2050 as projected by the United 
Nations in 2000 Revision of the population projection. While these demographic shifts are 
substantial, none is more dramatic than those projected for Japan where the elderly dependency 
ratio rises from 37.4% in 2000 to a projected 93.7% by 2050.  This substantial projected change 
in the demographic structure of Japan is likely to have a significant impact on the Japanese 
macro-economy. Yet there is a complex story behind the many facets of the change in 
demographic structures and how these might impact on an economy.  In addition, Japan has 
already experienced several decades of demographic change and it is interesting to explore what 
impacts demographic change has already had on the Japanese economy. 
This paper has a number of goals. It first sets out a methodology for capturing key 
aspects of the macroeconomic story in a global economic model. We focus on the impacts on 
labour supply, consumption and saving responses and then how in general equilibrium these 
responses impact on investment, trade and capital flows and asset markets.  The basic approach 
extends the methodology of Blanchard (1985), Weil (1989), Faruqee, Laxton, and Symansky 
(1997) and Faruqee (2000a, 2000b, 2003a, 2003b) to modelling consumption and saving 
behaviour. The extension to allow for children follows Bryant et al (2001, 2002, 2004) and 
McKibbin and Nguyen (2002). This paper is part of a series of papers jointly researched with 
Ralph Bryant and his colleagues using the Multimod approach to modelling and a team at ANU 
working with the MSG3 approach to modelling. The Bryant series of papers has tended to focus 
on critical theoretical extensions to the basic approach and to explore key sensitivities of the 
theoretical approach, more recently focussing on pension systems and fiscal implications of 
demographic change. The approach of McKibbin and Nguyen has been to attempt to implement 
the theoretical breakthroughs into more realistic models of the global economy. The focus in 
particular is to develop an empirical model of Japan for understanding the quantitative as well as 
qualitative issues facing the Japanese macro-economy. This paper focuses on the demographic 
transition in Japan. The next stage of this project is to explore how the demographic transition 
being experienced in the rest of the world is likely to impact on the Japanese economy.  
 In Section 2, the recent experience and future projections of demographic change in 
Japan are summarized. In Section 3, a small stylized analytical model, similar to that in Bryant 
and McKibbin (2004) is developed.  This is a very simple framework using approximations of 
multiple cohorts, based on a symmetric two country world where both countries are calibrated to 
the US economy. This simplified model is important for understanding the key analytical 
drivers. It is also consistent with the model developed by the Bryant team which is based on the 2 
 
analytical approach of the Multimod model. Results for a stylized dempgraphic shock are 
analyzed in section 4. In Section 5, starting with an almost common basis across the two 
modelling frameworks, we then add the empirical rigidities found in the MSG3 model (such as a 
mix of optimizing and backward looking households and firms) to the simple model and 
compare the theoretical representation to the MSG3 approach to the simple analytical model. 
Because of the symmetric nature of the model we are able to explore the impact of a stylized 
fertility decline that occurs in a single country (a large open economy) versus one that occurs 
globally (the world is a large closed economy).  In section 6, we then extend this approach to a 4 
country version of the MSG3 model in which the full macroeconomic and demographic 
representations of the four regions (United States, Japan, Rest of the OECD, and developing 
countries) are modelled. The real country asymmetries are captured in this more complete 
model. The model of Japan in this framework is the standard MSG3 model of Japan with 2 
sectors of production (energy and non-Energy). This empirical representation of Japan is then 
simulated using the same stylized fertility decline as in the analytical model but in the context of 
the Japanese economy. This gives an insight into the impact of the stylized demographic change 
that is the same shock as used in Bryant (2004) for comparison purposes when moving from a 
simple theoretical representation of a generic economy to a model that is based on Japanese data.  
In Section 7, we derive and simulate the actual demographic change projected by the United 
Nations 2003 Population projections together with the historical experience of Japan to explore 
the likely contribution of the actual decline in Japanese fertility rates from 1970 to 2030. A 
conclusion and future directions for research are contained in Section 8. 
 
2  Demographic Change in Japan 
There is already a large and growing literature on the many aspects of demographic 
change in Japan1 although few of these papers focus on the international aspects of Japan’s 
demographic shock. Exceptions are the recent work by Faruqee (2000a, 2003b). In this paper we 
                                                 
1 See for example Endo and Katayama  (1998), Horioka (1991), Meredith (1995), Ogawa and Retherford (1993), 
Takayama and Kitamura (1999), Takayama (1998), Takayama, Kitamura and Yoshida (1998), Yashiro and 
Oishi (1997), Yashiro (1998), Yashiro, Oshio, and Matsuya (1997).  
 3 
 
explore the issue of demographic change in Japan using a global modelling framework with a 
number of important decisions endogenous to the model, such as labour supply, human wealth 
accumulation, consumption and saving decisions, asset accumulation, investment demand and a 
full portfolio of asset prices.  
The consequences of Japanese demographic change on Japan is however is only part of 
the story, since global demographic change is likely to also impact on the Japanese economy in 
the coming decades. Future papers using the techniques applied in this paper will take a more 
global view, focussing on both the demographic shock in Japan and the demographic changes 
projected in the rest of the world.  
Table 2 presents a more detailed breakdown of the demographic transition in Japan from 
1950 to 2050. This is based on the 2002 Revision of the United Nations population projection 
(mid case) which contains substantial revisions compared to the earlier 1998 revision which was 
the basis of McKibbin and Nguyen (2002). It is clear from this table that the demographic 
adjustment in Japan is well under way.  
A characteristic of the changing demographics in Japan is the decline in fertility with 
births per year (in thousands) falling from 2073 in 1970-75 to 1213 in the latest available data 
for 1995-2000. This is projected to decline to 940 by 2040-2050 and translates into a birth rate 
decline from 1.92% to 0.75% by 2015, although there is significant uncertainty about these types 
of projections2.  Another characteristic of the Japanese demographic transition is the increased 
life expectancy from 63.9 years at birth in 1950 to 80.05 by 1995-2000 and this is further 
projected rise to 87.9 by 2040-2050. Despite this increased longevity, the death rate per thousand 
is expected to rise from 956 in 1995-2000 to 1593 in 2040-50. This rise in the crude death rate is 
because the elderly are an increasing share of the total population. All of these factors work in 
the one direction of an increasingly aging Japanese population. In contrast to many other 
countries these demographic trends also imply a shrinking Japanese population beginning this 
decade. 
 
                                                 
2 See Lee (2003) for a discussion. 4 
 
3  A Theoretical Framework for Incorporating Demographic Change in a 
Multi-Country Model 
There are two parts of the theoretical framework used in this paper. The first uses the MSG3 
multi-country model and the second embeds in this general equilibrium model, a theoretical 
approach to modelling demographic change. In this section we will first summarize the MSG3 
model and then present the demographic assumptions. 
3.1  The MSG3 Model 
The MSG3 multi-country model is based on the theoretical structure of the G-Cubed model 
outlined in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999)
3
. More details can be found in Appendix 1. A 
number of studies—summarized in McKibbin and Vines (2000)—show that the G-cubed model 
has been useful in assessing a range of issues across a number of countries since the mid-1980s.
4
  
Some of the principal features of the model are as follows: 
●  The model is based on explicit intertemporal optimization by the agents (consumers and 
firms) in each economy
5
. In contrast to static CGE models, time and dynamics are of 
fundamental importance in the G-Cubed model.  
●  In order to track the macro time series, however, the behaviour of agents is modified to 
allow for short run deviations from optimal behaviour either due to myopia or to restrictions on 
the ability of households and firms to borrow at the risk free bond rate on government debt. For 
both households and firms, deviations from intertemporal optimizing behaviour take the form of 
rules of thumb, which are consistent with an optimizing agent that does not update predictions 
                                                 
3
 Full details of the model including a list of equations and parameters can be found online at: www.gucubed.com 
4
 These issues include: Reaganomics in the 1980s; German Unification in the early 1990s; fiscal consolidation in 
Europe in the mid-1990s; the formation of NAFTA; the Asian crisis; and the productivity boom in the US. 
5 See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 5 
 
based on new information about future events. These rules of thumb are chosen to generate the 
same steady state behaviour as optimizing agents so that in the long run there is only a single 
intertemporal optimizing equilibrium of the model. In the short run, actual behaviour is assumed 
to be a weighted average of the optimizing and the rule of thumb assumptions. Thus aggregate 
consumption is a weighted average of consumption based on wealth (current asset valuation and 
expected future after tax labour income) and consumption based on current disposable income. 
Similarly, aggregate investment is a weighted average of investment based on Tobin’s q (a 
market valuation of the expected future change in the marginal product of capital relative to the 
cost) and investment based on a backward looking version of Q. 
●  There is an explicit treatment of the holding of financial assets, including money. Money is 
introduced into the model through a restriction that households require money to purchase goods.  
●  The model also allows for short run nominal wage rigidity (by different degrees in 
different countries) and therefore allows for significant periods of unemployment depending on 
the labour market institutions in each country. This assumption, when taken together with the 
explicit role for money, is what gives the model its “macroeconomic” characteristics. (Here 
again the model's assumptions differ from the standard market clearing assumption in most CGE 
models.)  
●  The model distinguishes between the stickiness of physical capital within sectors and 
within countries and the flexibility of financial capital, which immediately flows to where 
expected returns are highest. This important distinction leads to a critical difference between the 
quantity of physical capital that is available at any time to produce goods and services, and the 
valuation of that capital as a result of decisions about the allocation of financial capital. 
As a result of this structure, the MSG3 model contains rich dynamic behaviour, driven on the 
one hand by asset accumulation and, on the other by wage adjustment to a neoclassical steady 
state. It embodies a wide range of assumptions about individual behaviour and empirical 
regularities in a general equilibrium framework. The interdependencies are solved out using a 
computer algorithm that solves for the rational expectations equilibrium of the global economy. 
It is important to stress that the term ‘general equilibrium’ is used to signify that as many 
interactions as possible are captured, not that all economies are in a full market clearing 6 
 
equilibrium at each point in time. Although it is assumed that market forces eventually drive the 
world economy to a neoclassical steady state growth equilibrium, unemployment does emerge 
for long periods due to wage stickiness, to an extent that differs between countries due to 
differences in labour market institutions.  
3.2  A Theoretical Approach to Modelling Demographics  
The theoretical framework used in this paper is based on that of Bryant and McKibbin 
(2001), applied to the MSG3 multi-country model which is summarized in Appendix 1.  For the 
purposes of this paper, the MSG3 model has been extended to include demographic 
considerations, such that economic agents in the model now possess finite life-spans, and their 
incomes vary as they age.  Specifically, economic agents progress from being financially 
dependent children to eventually being adults who are financially responsible for their own 
children.  This section draws heavily on Faruqee (2000a, 2000b), who extended the Blanchard 
(1985) model of finitely-lived agents to include aging considerations.  It is very similar to Bryant 
and Velculescu (2002) and Bryant (2004) in the way in which children are modelled.   A key 
difference however it that in this paper we assume that all adults are assumed to bear the cost of 
providing support for children rather than having this support depend on the adult’s age6.  
3.2.1   Adult Population 
We begin by considering the adults in the population.  In each period, a cohort of children 
matures and joins the adult population.  The size of the newly matured cohort, at time s, with 
respect to the existing adult population, N(s) is referred to as the maturity rate, b(s).  The 
maturity rate and its relationship to the population of children will be addressed in another 
section, below.  Following Blanchard, we make the simplifying assumption that at any time s, all 
                                                 
6 Bryant and Velculescu (2002) show the sensitivity of the results to this assumption. We are unable to implement this in the more 
complex model of Japan below and therefore use this assumption in the simple theoretical model for comparison pruposes. 
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agents in the economy face the same mortality rate7, p, defined here as the probability of any 
given agent dying before the next period.  The number of adults who matured at a previous time 
s, who are still alive at a subsequent time t is given by:  
(1)   
) ( ) ( ) ( ) , (
s t p e s N s b t s n
− − =   
The adult population size can then be determined for any time t by summing the number of 
living adults from all of the cohorts that have ever matured: 
(2)   
ds e s N s b
ds t s n t N
s t p t
t
) ( ) ( ) (









where N(t) represents the adult population size, at time t. 
Taking the derivative with respect to time yields an equation governing the evolution of the adult 
population size over time: 
(3)    p t b
t N
t N




The above equation has a simple interpretation: the adult population grows at a rate determined 
by the maturity rate less the mortality rate. 
3.2.2   Child Population 
In every period, a cohort of children is born.  If we think of the adult population as representing 
the set of potential parents, then it follows that the size of a newly born cohort will depend upon 
                                                 
7.  Blanchard notes that the assumption of a common mortality rate is a reasonable approximation for adults within 
the ages of 20 to 40.  The fact that children and retirees, whose behaviour is of interest in studies of population 
aging, fall outside of this age bracket certainly indicates that the issue requires further attention. 8 
 
the current adult population size and the birth rate, bm.  The expression for the number of 
children born at time s who are still alive at a later time t, is thus given by: 
(4)   
) ( ) ( ) ( ) , (
s t p
m e s N s b t s m
− − =     
The aggregate number of children, M(t), can be calculated by summing the number of surviving 
children, who were born recently enough that they have not yet reached adulthood.  If we let ∆ 
represent the fixed number of years from when a child is born to when it reaches adulthood, i.e. 
the period of childhood8, then: 
(5)    ∫ ∆ − =
t
t ds t s m t M ) , ( ) (     





m ds e s N s b t M
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (     
Differentiating with respect to time: 
(7)   
∆ − ∆ − ∆ − − + − =
p
m m e t N t b t N t b t pM t M ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( &   
(Note that in the final exponential, p∆ refers to the period of childhood multiplied by the 
mortality rate, it does not represent a change in p). 
3.2.3   Relationship Between the Birth Rate and the Maturity Rate 
Of the children who were born at time t-∆, those who survive will mature at time t, at which time 
they are added to the adult population.  Thus, the maturity rate at time t is dependent on the 
birth-rate, and adult population size, of ∆ years past; as well as the mortality rate. 
                                                 
8.  In the simulations that follow, the period of childhood is defined as the first 16 years of an agent’s life; upon 
reaching his or her 16
th birthday, the agent becomes classified as an adult. 9 
 
(8)    
∆ − ∆ − ∆ − =
p
m e t N t b t N t b ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (     
Now, we know that: 
(9)    
∫ =







ds s b p
t
t
ds p s b
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) ( ) (
  
so given the birth rate of ∆ years ago, and the maturity rates over the last ∆ years, we can 
determine the current maturity rate: 





m e t b t b ∫ ∆ − = ∆ −
− ) (
) ( ) (     
Since the maturity rates over the last ∆ years will be dependent on previous values of the birth 
rate, we can see that the rate of maturity is predetermined by any given series of birth rates. 
3.2.4  Adult Consumption 
Adults attempt to maximise the expected utility derived from their lifetime consumption.  Adults 
must take into account the uncertainty of their life-spans and thus they discount their planned 
future consumption by the probability that they may not survive through to future periods.   
Assuming a logarithmic utility function, each agent will maximise the following: 
(11)      ∫
∞ + −
t
v p dv e v s c
) ( ) , ( ln max
θ   
subject to the budget constraint: 
(12)   ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ] ) ( [ ) , ( t s c t s y t s w p t r t s w − + + = &   
where c(s,t) is the consumption, at time t, of an adult who matured at time s, θ is the rate of time 
preference, w(s,t) is the financial wealth that an adult who matured at time s holds at time t; and 
r(t) is the interest rate earned on financial wealth.  In addition to interest payments, adults also 10 
 
earn a rate of p on their holdings of financial wealth, due to the assumption of a life insurance 
market, as in Blanchard.  Children do not play a part in the life insurance market, nor do they 
earn interest, as they are assumed to hold no financial wealth. 
The optimal consumption path for an adult can be shown to be: 
(13)   [ ] ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) , ( t s h t s w p t s c + + = θ   
where c(s,t) is the consumption, at time t, of an adult who matured at at time s, and h(s,t) 
represents the human wealth of the adult.  An adult’s human wealth is defined as the present 
value of the adult’s expected income over the remainder of his or her lifetime: 




di p i r
∫
∞+ −∫ = ) , ( ) , (
) (
 
At any time t, then, the sum of financial wealth and human wealth—w(s,t) and h(s,t)—represents 
an adult’s total wealth: the means by which the agent can pay for his or her future consumption.  
Adults consume a proportion of their total wealth each period, the proportion being determined 
by their rate of time preference, and their likelihood of perishing before the next period. 
Aggregate adult consumption, aggregate financial wealth and aggregate human wealth are 
simply the sums of the consumption, financial wealth and human wealth for all adults in the 
economy. 
(15)    ∫ ∞ − =
t
N ds t s n t s c t C ) , ( ) , ( ) (
  
(16)   ∫ ∞ − =
t
ds t s n t s w t W ) , ( ) , ( ) (   
(17)   ∫ ∞ − =
t
ds t s n t s h t H ) , ( ) , ( ) (  
where CN(t) represents aggregate adult consumption, W(t) is aggregate financial wealth, and H(t) 
is aggregate human wealth. 11 
 
The adult aggregate consumption function can be shown to be given by: 
(18)   [ ] ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( t H t W t p t CN + + = θ   
3.2.5  Labour Supply, and Demographic Considerations 
Empirically, one of the key economic characteristics that changes with age is the income that a 
person receives.  We thus introduce age-earnings profiles into the model, such that an agent’s 
income is determined by his or her age.  Further, we assume that only adults earn labour income, 
and that children are dependent upon adults.  Faruqee (2000a) utilises hump-shaped age-earnings 
profiles for adults, fitted to Japanese data using non-linear least squares (NLS).  Intuitively, the 
hump-shaped profile of age-earnings reflects the fact that young adults generally have incomes 
that are increasing as the young individuals age and gain more experience.  After a certain age, 
however, earnings decline, reflecting first the decreasing productivity associated with aging, and 
then eventually reflecting retirement behaviour.   
Individual income is not specified as suddenly dropping to zero, at a given retirement age, for 
two reasons.  Firstly, in practice, people typically retire at various ages, and some retirees 
continue to earn alternative forms of income even after retirement.  Secondly, a discontinuous 
age-earnings profile introduces complications with respect to implementation in the MSG3 
model. 
We model the evolution of income over the lifecycle by beginning with the assumption that 
individuals are paid a wage for each unit of effective labour that they supply.  We also assume 
that effective labour supply is a function of an individual’s age and of the current state of 
technology.  Aside from aging considerations, note that as time passes, the technological 
progress in the economy has a positive effect on the value of effective labour supplied by all 
agents. 
The effective labour supply, at time t, of an agent who has been an adult since time s, is given 
by: 







s t s t s t ut e a a e a e a e t s l
− − − − − − − − + + =
α α α ;  (ai>0, αi>0 for i=1 to 3)  12 
 
The e
µt component (where µ is the rate of technological progress) captures productivity increases 
due to advancements in technology.  The remaining terms represent the non-linear functional 
form used to estimate the hump-shaped profile.  The ai and αi parameters are estimated, based on 
empirical data, using NLS9.  The hump-shaped effective labour supply specification will in turn 
lead to a hump shaped age-earnings profile. 
Individual labour supply can be re-written as: 
(20)  ) , ( ) , (
3
1




=   
where:  
(21)  




i e a e t s l
− − =
α µ ; (ai>0,αi>0)    
and: 
(22)    ) 1 ( 2 1 3 a a a − − =   
Thus, the evolution of an adult’s labour supply over time is given by: 





) , ( ) ( ) , (
i
i i t s l t s l α µ &   
Aggregate effective labour supply in the economy for any time t, L(t), is the sum of the effective 
















ds t s l t s n t L
  
                                                 
9 Values used in this paper for Japan are as estimated by Faruqee for Japan: α1 = 0.073, : α2 = 0.096, : α3 = 0.085 and 
a1 = a2 = 200. In the theoretical model, to be consistent with Bryant (2004) we use the US parameters for both 13 
 
where: 
(25)   ds t s l t s n t L
t
i i ∫ ∞ − = ) , ( ) , ( ) (   
It can then be shown that: 
(26)  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
3 3 2 2 1 1
3 2 1
t N t b e t L p t L p t L p
t L t L t L t L
t
i
µ α µ α µ α µ + − − + − − + − − =
+ + = &
 
The intuition behind the equation above is that the aggregate labour supply of the economy 
changes as the entire population ages, and also as new agents mature into the labour force. 
Figure 1 shows the Alternative approximations for the age earnings profile for the United States. 
Figure 2 shows the data for the Age Earnings profiles in Japan from 1970 to 1997  
3.2.6   Intergenerational Transfer 
In our stylised model, children differ from adults, in that they do not provide labour supply (and 
thus do not receive payment for labour) and they do not hold financial wealth.  Children are 
dependent upon their parents; each child receives an intergenerational transfer every period, c(t), 
which is completely consumed by the child.  As they do not make any consumption decision, but 
rather just entirely consume their transfer, we do not need to account for their human wealth. 
We assume that c(t) grows at the rate of productivity growth, µ—as the economy becomes more 
efficient in production, children benefit. 
(27)   
t e c t c
µ
0 ) ( =   
                                                                                                                                                             
countries: α1 = 0.08152, : α2 = 0.12083, : α3 = 0.10076 and a1 = a2 = 200. 14 
 
The simplest specification10 for adult transfer payments is to assume that adults share the burden 
of supporting children equally, i.e. 
(28)   ) ( ) , ( t j t s j =   
where j(s,t) is the payment that an individual adult, who became an adult at time s, is liable for at 
time  t.  Note that transfer payments are bound by the following budget constraint, which 
constrains aggregate child receipts to equal aggregate adult payments: 
(29)    ∫ ∞ − =
t






ds t s n
t M t c
t j
) , (
) ( ) (
) (  
(31)   ) ( ) ( ) ( t t c t j δ =   
Aggregate consumption for the whole economy, then, is the sum of aggregate adult consumption 
and aggregate child consumption: 
 ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( t M t c t H t A p t C + + + = θ  (1) 
3.2.7    Income and Human Wealth 
Previously, individual human wealth was defined as the expected present-value of future income 
over an adult’s remaining lifetime.  Having defined the profile of labour supply over the 
lifecycle, we can now be more explicit with respect to income.  An adult’s income is after-tax 
labour income, plus government transfers, less lump sum taxes and intergenerational transfers: 
                                                 
10.  Bryant and Velculescu (2001) for example make most expenses for children fall on younger adults whereas we 
assume that adults of all ages contribute equally.  15 
 
(32)   ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) , ( t j t tx t tr t s l t w t t s y − − + − = τ  
where  y(s,t) denotes the income, at time t, of an adult who matured at time s;  l(s,t) is the 
individual effective labour supply; τ(t) is the marginal tax rate; and w(t) is the wage paid per unit 
of effective labour.  We assume that the distribution of lump sum taxes, tx, and government 
transfers, tr, is uniform across the population, thus the year of an individual’s coming of age is 
not a determinant of either of these two variables. 
We define aggregate adult income as: 
(33)   ds t s n t s y t Y
t
∫ ∞ − = ) , ( ) , ( ) (  
Taking the time derivative of h(s,t), after substituting in the expression for individual income, we 
obtain: 
(34)  )] ( ) ( ) ( [ ) , ( ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) , ( ] ) ( [ ) , ( t j t tx t tr t s l t w t t s h p t r t s h − − − − − + = τ &   
The intuition for the equation above is that as time passes, future earnings are no longer as 
distant in time, and should therefore be discounted by a lesser magnitude—this explains the (r + 
p) growth—while at the same time, some income has just been received, and thus can no longer 
be considered part of human wealth—this explains why the current period’s income is 
subtracted. 
We can show that the evolution of aggregate human wealth is governed by the following 
relationship: 
(35)  ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t t n t t h t Y t H t r t H + − = &  
The intuition behind the equation above is that aggregate human wealth changes over time as 
future income draws nearer, thus H grows at the rate of r; the presence of death, and hence p, 
does not affect aggregate human wealth, because insurance companies redistribute the wealth of 
the dead.  Further, in each period, people receive income, and having been received, it can no 16 
 
longer be considered human wealth.  The last term on the right hand side represents the new 
human wealth that the newly-matured cohort brings to the economy, each period. 
4  Results from the theoretical model 
 
This section uses a stylized model based on the theoretical specification of the MSG3 
model with some key simplifications. We assume first that they are no backward looking agents. 
Thus consumption and investment is assumed to be undertaken by fully optimizing agents. 
Indeed if the probability of death was zero, this model would be a fully Ricardian model in 
which the rate of time preference determines the real rate of interest at each point of time. The 
introduction of a probability of death (as in Blanchard (1985)) implies a finite lifetime for all 
agents and the pure Ricardian equivalence propositions not longer apply.  
In the calibration here we follow Bryant (2004) and choose the birth rate of children of 
2.50408% per year and an infant mortality rate of 0.075%. This generates an adult maturity rate 
of 2% per year. We also assume that the adult mortality rate is 0.15% and productivity growth in 
the economies is 2% per year.  
To solve the model, we first normalize all quantity variables by each economy's 
endowment of effective labour units. In the case of some variables such as population we 
normalize by per capita rather than effective units. This means that in the steady state all real 
variables are constant in these units although the actual levels of the variables will be growing at 
the underlying rate of growth of population plus productivity. Next, we must make base-case 
assumptions about the future path of the model's exogenous variables in each region. In all 
regions we assume that the long run real interest rate is 5 percent, tax rates are held at their 2002 
levels and that fiscal spending is allocated according to 2002 shares. Population growth rates 
vary across regions as per the 2000 World Bank population projections. 
  A crucial group of exogenous variables are productivity growth rates by sector and 
country. The usual baseline assumption in the MSG3 and G-Cubed models is that the pattern of 
technical change at the sector level is similar to the historical record for the United States (where 
data is available). In regions other than the United States, however, the sector-level rates of 17 
 
technical change are scaled up or down in order to match the region’s observed average rate of 
aggregate productivity growth over the past 5 years. This approach attempts to capture the fact 
that the rate of technical change varies considerably across industries while reconciling it with 
regional differences in overall growth. In the model in the final section of this paper we attempt 
to do this more realistic baseline projection, but for the simple models in the next few sections, 
we assume that all sectors and countries grow at the same underlying rate of productivity growth 
of 2% per year.  It is important to note that this is a different approach to Bryant (2004) in which 
the model starts in steady state. In the current paper we assume that the model is on the stable 
transition path towards a steady state, given the data set we calibrate to. 
  Given these assumptions, we solve for the model's perfect-foresight equilibrium growth 
path over the period 2002-2200. This a formidable task: the endogenous variables in each of the 
199 periods need to be solved out and include, among other things: the equilibrium prices and 
quantities of each good in each region, intermediate demands for each commodity by each 
industry in each region, asset prices by region and sector, regional interest rates, bilateral 
exchange rates, incomes, investment rates and capital stocks by industry and region, 
international flows of goods and assets, labour demanded in each industry in each region, wage 
rates, current and capital account balances, final demands by consumers in all regions, and 
government deficits.11 At the solution, the budget constraints for all agents are satisfied, 
including both intra-temporal and inter-temporal constraints. 
  In this section we introduce a stylized fall in fertility rates to the theoretical 
model. This follows the same shock as in Bryant (2004)12. This is shown in Figure 3. The birth 
rate of children begins to decline from year 1 and reaches a trough of 1.15 percentage points by 
                                                 
11 Since the model is solved for a perfect-foresight equilibrium over a 80 year period, the numerical complexity of 
the problem is on the order of 80 times what the single-period set of variables would suggest. We use software 
summarized in McKibbin and Sachs (1991) Appendix C, for solving large models with rational expectations on 
a personal computer. 
12 Note that in the implementation in the 4 country MSG3 model we assume children are up to 16 years of age due 
to data requirements. In the theoretical model we adopt the Bryant convention of a child being anyone up to age 
18. The difference this makes to the results are small. 18 
 
year 53. This fall in the birth rate of children impacts on the income of adults immediately but 
does not impact on the maturity rate of adults until year 19. The maturity rate (or adult birth rate) 
reaches a trough of -0.81556 percent points by 71 years into the simulation. The key difference 
between the simulations in this paper and Bryant (2004) is that in that paper both domestic and 
foreign countries experience a demographic transition where the foreign country experiences a 
faster transition. The difference between the two demographic transitions is scaled to be the 
same in this paper and Bryant (2004). In the current paper we return the birth rates to the original 
levels after a long period. This has to be done for technical reasons related to the numerical 
solution technique but doesn’t affect the early stages on the simulations. The key is that the 
relative shocks are the same in the two studies. 
We consider two alternatives regarding this demographic shock. The first is that the 
shock occurs simultaneously in both countries. This is equivalent to a closed economy because 
neither the exchange rate nor trade and capital flows will change. We then assume that the shock 
only occurs in the foreign country to get an insight into the likely impacts of the demographic 
shock on bilateral trade and asset flows and real exchange rate adjustment.  
In the following figures, all results are expressed as deviation from the baseline solution 
of the model, either in percentage, percentage points or however indicated on the figures. 
  Results for both countries are contained in Figures 4 through 7.  Following Bryant 
(2004) and earlier papers we label one country “US” for the United States and the other country 
“ZZ”. These figures show the deviation from the baseline for the global shock (labelled as 
“closed economy”) which is the same for each country. The figures also show the results for 
both countries when the shock only occurs in the ZZ economy.  
4.1  Symmetric Shock 
When the shock is the same in both countries, the assumption of model symmetry shows 
that there is no change in exchange rates or trade and current account balances. All adjustments 
are contained within the “large closed economy” experiencing the shock.  The shock is a gradual 
decline in the birth rate. Thus the incomes of households effectively rise in the first 18 years as 
there are fewer children to support although aggregate consumption need not change since this is 19 
 
a substitution within households. The real economic impacts occur when there are less children 
maturing into adults and entering the work force 19 years after the initial shock. Recall that 
effective labour inputs are calculated using age earnings profiles so that as the cohort of lower 
birth rate adults move through the workforce, the effective loss of workers is magnified by the 
loss in workers when they move through more productive years. These missing workers have 
their biggest per unit impact at around age 40, or 40 years after the demographic shock began but 
the increasing reduction in numbers of workers means that the demographic transition lasts well 
past 100 years by which time the initial shocks are returned to zero. 
As expected with a significant fall in aggregate workers in the foreign economy, the 
aggregate macroeconomic variables began to show sharp decline about 40 years after the initial 
shock. Real GDP is 60% lower after 100 years compared to baseline. Aggregate consumption 
adjusts more quickly as individual households attempt to smooth their consumption over their 
lifetime.  The story at the individual level is quite different to the aggregate story. In the short 
run households individually attempt to smooth their consumption given expected future changes 
in individual income and expected future changes in aggregate variables such as real interest 
rates that affect their intertemporal decisions. Households initially cut their consumption slightly 
using the fact that there is less need for spending on children to spread this across future 
consumption and also in response to lower relative price of future consumption (i.e. lower real 
interest rates).  Per capita GDP also rises since there is a realization that future output will need 
more capital per worker to sustain production, which stimulates investment. Figure 4 shows that 
the capital output ratio in sector 2 (non energy) rises significantly for the first 8 decades. The rise 
in investment stimulates the economy and raises per capita GDP for 5 decades.  
An important aspect of the shock is the effect on real interest rates. Real interest rates fall 
over time to be 0.9 percentage points (90 basis points) less than otherwise.  The global nature of 
the shock means that there is now an imbalance between saving and investment as households 
attempt to push their current consumption into the future. Investment rises but by less than 
savings and thus real interest rates fall. Another way to interpret this result is that with fewer 
workers over time the marginal product of capital must fall. This is reflected through the real 
arbitrage in the model between the marginal product of capital and the real interest rate which 
drives real interest rates lower until the capital stock can adjust.  20 
 
In terms of quantitative outcomes, the result for real interest rates is a key difference to 
Bryant (2004). The reason for this difference is the assumption in the MSG3 model that the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unity (i.e. log utility) where Bryant (2004) assumes an 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.513. Thus interest rates move by a little more than 
twice more in the results in Bryant (2004) compared with the results in this paper.  This is a 
critical parameter in both studies and is the subject of a wide ranging debate in the literature. 
4.2  Asymmetric Shock 
Results for the shock that only occurs in the foreign country are also shown in figures 4 
through 6. It is clear that in the country experiencing the shock, results are very similar to those 
for the global shock. The key lesson is that the availability of other countries not experiencing 
the demographic shock enables some capacity through the balance of payments, to reduce the 
impact of the shock in the foreign country. The aggregate effects are less for both GDP 
consumption. The rise in savings as a result of the action of individual households in the ZZ 
country now translates into a current account surplus for many decades at the beginning of the 
shock. This saving finds a higher rate of return outside the ZZ country. This shows up initially as 
a current account surplus and a trade  surplus. Over time however the return on the savings are 
repatriated back to the ZZ economy and this shows up as a swing into trade balance deficit. Note 
that one country’s deficit must be another’s surplus.  
The ability of households and firms in the ZZ country to use the US to help smooth the 
shock implies that there is less of a need for capital deepening in the ZZ country. Equity market 
values rise and fall by less (as shown by Tobin’s q in figure 5). This smoothing is shown even 
more clearly in the per capita outcome for consumption and GDP in figure 5. As expected the 
real interest rate outcomes are also less extreme.   
                                                 
13 See Appendix 2 page 47 of Bryant et al (2003) for a clear exposition of the role and empirical importance of the 
value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. 21 
 
One interesting aspect of the adjustment  is the path of the real exchange rate shown in 
Figure 6. The outflow of capital in the short run as households and firms intertemporally adjust 
causes a depreciation of the real exchange rate for the US. Over time the real exchange rate 
appreciates as this capital is repatriated to the ZZ country to finance future consumption. On top 
of this asset allocation effect, there is also a real fundamental adjustment in the real exchange 
rate. The utility function of households in both countries consists of a CES function of all goods. 
Thus the facts that there are fewer goods produced by the ZZ country (both energy and non-
energy) available over time as production rises less quickly, implies that the relative price of 
these goods will rise. Thus a key driver of the long term real exchange rate outcome is the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate of the ZZ country (or the rise in the relative price of its 
production). This effect is quite large as would be expected given the shift in relative economic 
weight of the two countries. After a century the real exchange rate appreciates by more than 40 
percent. This is the same story as in Bryant (2004) although the magnitudes are different for the 
same reason as for the interest rate outcomes. There is less adjustment of asset prices when the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is higher, as in this paper.  
The nominal exchange rate path is driven by the assumption about monetary policy. In 
this paper, in contrast to Bryant (2004) and earlier papers using this model, we now assume that 
monetary authorities follow a modified Henderson McKibbin Rule14 in which they adjust the 
nominal short term interest rates based on the lagged nominal interest rate and the gap between 
actual and desired inflation and the gap between actual and potential growth rates of real output.  
Clearly from Figure 6, the ZZ price level rises relative to the domestic price levels and monetary 
authorities are slow to offset the effects of rising inflation due to a decline in the growth of 
capacity output 
Another aspect of the adjustment through the balance of payments is the accumulation of 
foreign assets (figure 6) which is the counterpart of the current account surpluses. Within the 
trade balance the share of imports in GDP rises more for the ZZ country for the asymmetric 
shock than for the global shock as agents attempt to adjust their relative consumption baskets. As 
                                                 
14 See Levin et al (1999) and Appendix 1. 22 
 
a result of the demographic shock in the ZZ country, there are relatively less ZZ goods and 
relative more US goods available.  
This stylized model has many useful insights that parallel those in Bryant (2004). It is 
interesting to add further complexity to this framework to see how robust the basic insights are. 
This is done in the following sections. 
5  Simplest Model versus a stylized MSG3 Model 
 
  In Section 4 we used the simplest benchmark theoretical model that is consistent with the 
approach of the MSG3 model. We now introduce some rigidities in agent’s behaviour that is 
found in the larger MSG3 model. In particular we assume that 70% of households do not re-
optimize continually but follow an optimal rule of thumb where their consumption is a 
proportion of current income (both from labour and returns on financial assets). Similarly we 
assume that 70% of firms are using an error correction model for Tobin’s Q in which the Q 
determining their investment gradually adjusts to the true underlying Tobin’s Q. 
We continue to maintain the assumption that countries are symmetric and of equal size. The 
question of country size and structure will be shown to matter once we move to more realistic 
models of Japan. 
The results for this Symmetric MSG3 model are shown in figures 7 through 9. The main 
result is that the movement away from complete intertemporal optimization does not change the 
qualitative story very much within the countries but does change the interactions between 
countries. The main difference from introducing less forward looking behaviour is that there is 
less smoothing of consumption. Thos shows in Figure 7 where there is a smaller current account 
surplus for the first two decades. This contrasts which much larger swings in the current account 
deficits in later years. A similar difference can be found in the adjustment of the trade balance 
between the two countries.  The lack of smoothing through the balance of payments also shows 
up in a larger fall in consumption after a century in the MSG3 model compared to the theoretical 
model. 23 
 
  Overall it seems that reducing the extent of optimization by agents seems to have 
significant quantitative but not qualitative impacts on the basic story about adjustments to 
demographic shocks. The overall story is dominated by the large demographic swings and how 
these feed into change in labour supply and output on the supply side and consumption and 
investment behaviour on the demand side. Perhaps the apparently small impact of reducing the 
extent of forward looking behaviour is not surprising, given that the introduction of finite 
lifetimes already reduces the forward looking-ness of households in the model. 
6  Results in the 4 Region MSG3 Model 
 
  We now move away from the largely theoretical world of the small models used in 
sections 4 and 5, to try and capture the actual characteristics of the world economy.  We now 
incorporate the same theoretical demographic assumptions used in the smaller models above, 
into the MSG3 model aggregated so that there are four main regions: Japan, The United States, 
the rest of the OECD (ROECD) and the rest of the world (ROW). As well as incorporating the 
key differences between these economies as captured in the structure of the full MSG3 model, 
we also change the demographic characteristics to suit each of the countries actual demographic 
features. This involves using actual estimated age earnings profiles for the United States, Japan 
and the rest of the OECD. For the ROW region we use the ROECD estimates. 
  We also start with exactly the same demographic shock as in the theoretical models 
above so as to have a benchmark for comparison. The current results will illustrate how different 
our theoretical insights might be when we allow for a number of key differences such as 
asymmetries in country production structures, consumption baskets, composition of trade flows, 
net asset positions etc.  However we do not at this stage calculate individually what each 
difference makes but only what the entire group of differences make as a whole for the stylized 
shock. 
  Results are contained in figures 10 through 12 for a demographic shock that only occurs 
in Japan. It is assumed to occur today as a benchmark for the theoretical models. In this case the 
results for Japan can be compared to the “foreign country” in the theoretical models. We also 
truncate the results to focus on the first 80 years of the shock given the numerical problems of 24 
 
solving large model over several hundred years. It is important when comparing the results in 
figures 10 through 12 with figure 7 through 9 to remember the difference in time periods 
between the simulations. 
  Figure 10 shows that the aggregate results for GDP and consumption follow a similar 
profile to those for the theoretical MSG3 model, although the initial rise in GDP is more 
pronounced and the subsequent fall in GDP is larger for Japan in the 4 country model than for 
the generic ZZ country in the smaller models. The demographic shock is the same but the age 
earnings profiles in Japan are quite different to those in the small model (where we use age 
earnings profiles for the US in both the US and ZZ models to preserve symmetry). This larger 
effective shock results in a large fall in effective workers in Japan relative to the theoretical 
model which was based on the US age earnings profile.  There is also a large rise in the current 
account surplus for Japan for the 8 decades shown which peaks at 1.5% of GDP after 25 years. 
This outcome reflects a range of issues but in particular the larger initial holding of net foreign 
assets in Japan compared to the zero holdings in the theoretical models. 
It is interesting that although the Japan in the large model is a much smaller share of the 
global economy than the ZZ country is in the small models (i.e. it was 50% of the world), the 
effects on asset markets of the Japanese demographic shock within Japan are still large. Real 
interest rates in Japan fall by over 2% after 80 years compared to 0.5% the theory models. The 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate is also twice as large in the Japan model after 80 years 
(60% versus 25%). The Yen also appreciates in nominal terms as a result of a combination of 
factors. 
Introducing a more realistic representation of the Japanese economy including it’s relative 
economic size, trade structure, initial asset balances, structure of production and consumption 
and Japanese age earnings profiles quantitatively change the results we found in the simple two 
country stylized model. However, the qualitative story from the theoretical models remains 
robust to the more realistic representation on the Japanese economy. This is an important result 
because it means that the theoretical advances in other research such as Bryant (2004) do give 
useful insights for policymakers on the likely qualitative story behind a large global 
demographic transition. It is perhaps not surprising that although the basic story from the 25 
 
theoretical models remains robust, the quantitative magnitudes of effects are sensitive to the 
quantitative specification of the model. 
7  The Impact of Demographic Change in Japan Since 1970 
 
The earlier sections examined the impact of a stylized demographic shock within 
increasingly complex models of the world economy. In this section we present results for a 
demographic shock in Japan that corresponds to the actual changes since 1970 and projected 
changes from 2000.  The goal is to see what contribution demographic change might have made 
to the Japanese macroeconomic experience since 1970 and what might be expected over coming 
decades. 
Before proceeding, we need to raise a difficult problem with simulating demographic 
shocks in a model with rational expectations. In the four country model we have assumed that 
children become adults after 16 years. Thus a surprise change in the birth rate today will be a 
perfectly predicted change in the adult population 17 years hence. In most papers that ignore 
children, changes in birth rates are assumed to be the arrival of new adults into the work force.  
The simulation we undertake is a realisation that there is a change in the birth rate of children 
from 1970 onwards (based on UN actual birth rates and projected rates past 2000). This implies 
in 1970 there is also a known shock to the adult population from 1986 onwards. In comparing 
this simulation with the results from our earlier study without children, it should be kept in mind 
that in the model with children, we are assuming that in 1970 people expect the adult birth rate to 
change from 1986 onwards and have a good idea of the macroeconomic implications of this. For 
a strict comparison we could assume that the change in the adult birth rate occurs in 1986 by 
complete surprise, even though it was the result of a change in the birth of children from 1970 
onwards. This latter assumption corresponds to the simulation in McKibbin and Nguyen (2001) 
in which there were no children. Although we remain uneasy about the assumptions behind the 
simulations presented and how much people realised there was a demographic transition in 
19970 to impact on 1986, these results are illustrative of the likely consequences for Japan of the 
demographic change currently under way.  26 
 
In simulating the model from 1970, we re-bench the demographic model of age structure 
etc to be at the 1970 structure and change the net asset positions of countries but we keep the 
other data calibration as for the standard MSG3 model. Thus this is not a complete recalibration 
of the entire model based on 1970 but a partial recalibration of key initial conditions. We first 
solve the model from 1970 to 2100 in order to get a baseline in which no further demographic 
shocks are present. We then commence the counterfactual simulation in 1970 on the assumption 
that the demographic shock becomes news in that year. The assumption that the demographic 
shock is unanticipated until 1970 might be regarded as problematic for a number of reasons. In a 
model with rational expectations we have little choice than to make that assumption. The main 
consequence is that the results for 1970 and years around that date are likely to be less accurate 
than results by the time the model reaches 2000 and beyond. Given we are interested in what is 
likely to happen from now for the next several decades, this assumption may not be such a 
problem for the analysis. However, the reader is cautioned to interpret the results from 1970 to 
2000 with great care. Nonetheless they give some insight into the likely impact of the 
demographic transition already occurring in Japan.   
A second important qualification is that we are not imposing a demographic transition in 
the other countries outside Japan in these results. This could be important and will be undertaken 
in future research. As shown in the results above with the simpler models, this is unlikely to have 
a major impact on the results for Japanese variables but might be important for the scale of the 
results for bilateral variables such as exchange rates and current account adjustment. 
Table 3 contains projections from the United Nations Population Division World 
Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision (Medium Variant Projections). These are converted 
into adult population growth rates (defined as the growth in the adult population) and the 
maturity rate, which is the rate at which children become adults as a proportion of the adult 
population. Think of this as the adult birth rate (in terms of our earlier). It is clear that to fit the 
actual experience into the assumption of our modelling framework requires some simplifying 
assumptions. In the actual data, the mortality rate varies over time as does the mortality rate by 
cohort. We have to convert these numbers into rates consistent with the assumption of a constant 
mortality rate over time and over cohorts.  The key variable that is tied down is the adult 27 
 
population growth rate so that we capture the changes in the labour force over time. The child 
birth rate is then calculated to give this aggregate outcome. 
Figure 13 shows the maturity rate and adult population growth rate in the UN projections 
out to 2050. Figure 14 shows the birth rate, maturity rate and adult mortality rate over the entire 
period. This figure contains three lines. The mortality rate is the death rate for adults. We assume 
that the death rate for children is 0.75%. The birth rate is the birth rate of children (expressed a 
percent of the adult population) and the maturity rate is the rate at which children become adults 
in terms of the adult population (simply thought of as the “adult birth rate”). To get the child 
birth rate, we take the maturity rate from the UN projections and our assumption about the 
mortality rate and back out the implied birth rate of children in terms of the adult population. 
None of the figures contain the more conventional notation of a population growth rate since we 
express everything in terms of adults not totals for reasons outlined in section 3. 
Another feature of Figure 14 is that it reflects the UN projections out to 2050 and then an 
arbitrary assumption that the rates return to the baseline rates gradually after 2050. This 
assumption will clearly matter for results past 2050 and for the expectations of earlier periods 
about the future. For our purposes it is numerically simpler to assume reversion and this 
assumption has little impact on the results from 1970 to 2020, which is our main focus. In 
summary this shock can be characterized as a sharp fall in the birth rate of children from 1970 
followed from 1986 by a fall in the maturity rate (i.e. rate of emergence of new adults into the 
working adult population). After 2050, the birth rate gradually returns to baseline.  This is 
similar in many ways to the stylized shock used in sections 4 to 6 and in Bryant (2004). 
Figure 15 shows the impact of the assumptions on the child population, the adult working 
population and the effective labour supply, shown as percent deviation from what would have 
been the case in the baseline, without the change in the birth rate. The overshooting of effective 
labour supply, relative to the population decline, reflects the aging of the population and the 
movement of the current working population along the age earnings profile with declining 
effectiveness as they move past the peak earning years of 40-45 year of age. The profile of the 
effective labour force (relative to the baseline) seems rather large but reflects the size of the 
estimated coefficients of the age earnings profile from Japanese data (based on Faruqee (2000a)). 
Future work will explore the sensitivity of the results to these parameters.  28 
 
  Figures 16 through 18 shows results for Japan for the shock summarized above. These 
results are expressed as deviation from the baseline (which has the estimated age earnings 
profiles but no changes in birth rates) expressed as either percent deviation from baseline or 
percentage point deviation from baseline as indicated.  It is important to note that the underlying 
baseline without the demographic transition has underlying growth in Japan of close to 3% per 
year. Thus when we present results of variables falling relative to base this does not mean that 
they are falling in absolute terms. The slope of a curve showing percent deviation from baseline 
for variables is the deviation from baseline of the growth rate of that variable. Thus if GDP is 
falling relative to baseline by 1% per year it is still rising in absolute terms by 2% per year rather 
than 3% per year. 
Figure 17 contained results express per adult whereas the remaining charts show results 
for the broader macro economy.  These results can also be interpreted as the relative contribution 
of the demographic adjustment in Japan to the changes in Japanese variables over time. 
The realization that the demographic shock is to occur leads to a rise in private saving or 
a fall in consumption (fig 17, top right hand chart). Once the adult population begins to change 
from 1987, per capita saving rises even more than aggregate because the population of adults is 
falling. An interesting aspect of the shock is that although real GDP growth is expected to 
eventually decline over time, there is a realization that the capital stock will need to rise in Japan 
as workers become scarce in the future. The initial rise in GDP is caused by a desire to gradually 
increase the capital stock through greater investment and through the improvement in the current 
account through a rise in net exports as Japanese saving channels overseas. The rise in 
investment and net exports causes a short term Keynesian style overshooting in GDP in the early 
years of the shock. This lasts for a number of decades until the large fall in the number of people 
in Japan leads to a fall in the capital stock in Japan (past 2050). The current account moves into 
surplus (relative to baseline) (figure 16) and stays in surplus until 2020. The trade balance 
gradually moves towards deficit as foreign investments made during the earlier period are 
repatriated from overseas.  
The movement in the real exchange rate is consistent with the relative changes in saving 
and investment. In the long run, the consumption side of the model in which all households in all 
countries consume a share of Japanese goods in their consumption bundle implies that as less 
Japanese goods are produced, their relative value will rise. Thus as shown in the theoretical 29 
 
model, a long run real appreciation of the Yen is expected. In the short run, this effect partly 
determines the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate is also determined by the allocation of 
international financial capital.  In the short run the saving response dominates the investment 
response and there is a depreciation of the yen in real terms (relative to the baseline which has an 
appreciating yen). The strong investment response during 2000 and onwards begins a period of 
appreciation relative to baseline.  In earlier papers without children in the model, the investment 
response dominated the short run and a net capital inflow was found. However in that earlier 
paper the change in the labour force occurred in the first period and new capital was urgently 
needed. In this more realistically simulation the change in the labour force is expected to occur 
17 years into the future thus the saving response dominates the investment response in the short 
run.  
8  Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper has attempted to explore the implications of changing demographic structures in 
Japan by starting with a simple theoretical framework and moving to a complete global model 
with Japan a central focus. The starting point of the paper is aligned with the theoretical work in 
Bryant (2004) although we both branch out into different directions. This paper demonstrates 
that the insights in the various papers by the Brookings team using a theoretical framework 
based on the Multimod model gives broadly similar insights into the key issues and key 
sensitivity of results as the MSG3 approach. While Bryant et al (2003) and Bryant (2004) extend 
the theoretical approach that can subsequently be implemented in the MSG3 model; we have 
tried to undertake the extremely difficult agenda of implementing the theoretical developments 
into empirically based models of Japan.  
The results in this paper suggest some important implications of current and expected 
demographic adjustment in Japan. The results may be specifically driven by key assumptions in 
the modelling framework used and substantial more research is required to understand key 
sensitivities. In particular we have found that many of the differences between the earlier results 
from the MSG3 approach and the Multimod approach can be traced to core assumptions about 
initial conditions or key parameters such as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 
consumption.  30 
 
The paper shows that the type of demographic shock already underway in Japan and which is 
expected to persist for many decades has important impacts on the Japanese economy although it 
is very important to distinguish between the aggregate impacts versus the per capita impacts.   
According to the results in this paper the big aggregate adjustments in Japan are likely to occur 
commencing from around 2010. These include a fall in consumption and GDP growth relative 
to baseline but strong investment out to at least 2040 as capital is substituted for labour. Note 
that the baseline assumes GDP growth without any demographic transition of close to 3% per 
year so the actual growth rate in Japan with still be over 1% per year in absolute terms – the 
results show the deviation relative to that growth rate. Between 2010 and 2020 the slope of the 
deviation from base curve for GDP in figure 16 suggest a fall in the growth rate of GDP of 1% 
per year and 2% per year from 2020 relative to base. Also there is predicted to be a period of 
appreciating real exchange rates and falling real interest rates. To the extent that the investment 
response we currently observe in Japan may not be happening to the extent predicted by the 
simulation results, this points to a possible problem of the current Japanese economic difficulties 
for the adjustment to the demographic shocks. It may also point to a deficiency in the model.  
Indeed an inference that the reader might draw from the results of this paper is that because the 
actual response of the Japanese economy from 1990 to 2001 has been quite different to that 
predicted by the model, the model must be incorrect. However, an alternative inference is that 
the malaise in the Japanese economy in the last decade has overshadowed the underlying process 
captured by this model. Thus there needs to be an assessment of the range of shocks facing Japan 
during the 1990s, independently of the demographic shock, before a firm conclusion can be 
drawn15. It is also clearly important to include the demographic adjustments in the rest of the 
world before a firm conclusion can be drawn. 
  One key difference between the results in this paper and our earlier research summarized 
in McKibbin and Nguyen (2001) is the pattern of current account adjustment. In the earlier paper 
the current account moved into deficit initially. In the current paper there is a sustained period of 
current account surpluses accompanied by eventual deficits in the balance of trade. The key 
reason for this difference is in the nature of the demographic shock. In the earlier result we 
                                                 
15 See for example Callen and McKibbin (2001). 31 
 
assumed that the falling adult population was a surprise when it started and thus their needed to 
be a rise in current investment, which was larger than the rise in current saving. In this paper the 
shock to the future adult population is anticipated well in advance once the realization of a 
changing child birth rate is observed. Thus the short-run response of saving begins immediately 
while the investment response is delayed until the additional capital required to replace the 
disappearing workers is needed.  We also assume a higher productivity growth rate in this new 
model and hence current account changes can be sustained by productivity growth. The key to 
the balancing of the intertemporal budget constraint can be found in the adjustment of the trade 
balance (i.e. there can be permanent changes in the stocks of assets). Thus the current account 
moves into surplus in this paper rather than into deficit as was found in that earlier paper.  
We have attempted to begin the analysis in this paper in line with the basic theoretical 
starting point of Bryant (2004) and have found many similarities in the results across the two 
different frameworks. Once we move away from the simple model we find results change just as 
they do once the issue of pension systems are introduced as in Bryant (2004). One of the issues 
which appears to have an important affect on the results are the consequences of initial 
conditions matter for the subsequent adjustment. This was true in moving from the MSG3 model 
with 4 countries for the stylized shock and attempting to replicate the Japanese conditions since 
1970. Some of the issues that emerge in creating the initial demographic data is outlined in 
Appendix 1 but there are a range of further sensitivity analysis required to fully understand key 
results.  Another important issue is the fact that the full MSG3 model departs from the stylised 
model of Bryant and McKibbin (2001) by allowing imperfection in the model such as the degree 
of optimizing versus backward looking consumers and firms. The more inertia in the MSG3 
model compared to the simple analytical models of that earlier work, the more dampened is the 
degree of intertemporal smoothing.  Yet an equally important consideration is the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in consumption already demonstrated by Bryant et al (2003) to be 
important. 
The results in this paper are preliminary and significantly more work is needed on the 
modelling the nature of the demographic shock as well as sensitivity analysis on the key 
determinants of the macroeconomic outcomes. However over the past years of research we have 
been able to refine the modelling and understand better the key issues. Also Japan is not 32 
 
undergoing a demographic transition in isolation from the rest of the world and once the foreign 
demographic changes are incorporated into the analysis the results for Japan could be quite 
different. Nonetheless, the results to date suggest that the approach taken in this paper using the 
MSG3 model and the research in the Brookings Institution Project using the Multimod approach 
but focussing on theoretical developments is very promising and has generated important and 
robust insights. However as with most research the results of this paper raise more questions for 
future research.  33 
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Appendix I: A Stylized MSG3 multicountry model 
 
 
The model used in this paper is a reduced version of the MSG3 multi-country model. We 
aggregate the world into four regions: Japan; the United States; rest of the OECD and rest of the 
world. In the model used in Bryant and McKibbin (2001) the countries in the simplified MSG3 
model were assumed to be symmetric representations of the US economy with simplified 
functional forms and full intertemporal optimising agents. In this paper we use the empirically 
based MSG3 model with the Japanese economy based on the Japanese economy in the MSG3 
model and with rigidities in consumption and investment decisions found in the larger model. 
In the remainder of this section we present the essence of the MSG3 model. The MSG3 
model is based on the G-Cubed model of McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999). The key difference 
between the MSG3 model and the G-Cubed model is that we aggregate the 12 sectors in each 
country to 2 sectors (energy and non-energy). This is very similar to the structure of the MSG2 
model of McKibbin and Sachs (1991) except that we use the econometric estimation of the G-
Cubed model to parameterise the model. The reader is referred to chapters 2 and 5 of McKibbin 
and Wilcoxen (2002) for greater detail on the analytical basis of the model. 
The MSG3 model captures the behaviour of several economic agents: households, the 
government, the financial sector and 2 firms, one each in the 2 production sectors in each 
economy. The two sectors of production are energy and non-energy (this is much like the 
aggregate structure of the MSG2 model).  The following gives an overview of the theoretical 
structure of the model by describing the decisions facing these agents in one of these countries. 
Throughout the discussion all quantity variables will be normalized by the economy's 
endowment of effective labour units.  Thus, the model's long run steady state will represent an 
economy in a balanced-growth equilibrium. 
A. Firms 
We assume that each of the two sectors can be represented by a price-taking firm that 
chooses variable inputs and its level of investment in order to maximize its stock market value. 38 
 
Each firm’s production technology is represented by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function.  Output is a function of capital, labor, energy and materials: 
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where Qi is the output of industry i, xij is industry i's use of input j, and Ai
o,  o
ij δ , and σi
o  are 
parameters. Ai
o reflects the level of technology, σi
o  is the elasticity of substitution, and the  o
ij δ  
parameters reflect the weights of different inputs in production; the superscript o indicates that 
the parameters apply to the top, or “output”, tier.  Without loss of generality, we constrain 
the o
ij δ 's to sum to one. 
 
  The goods and services purchased by firms are, in turn, aggregates of imported and 
domestic commodities, which are taken to be imperfect substitutes.  We assume that all agents in 
the economy have identical preferences over foreign and domestic varieties of each commodity.  
We represent these preferences by defining composite commodities that are produced from 
imported and domestic goods.  Each of these commodities, Yi, is a CES function of inputs 
domestic output, Qi, and an aggregate of goods imported from all of the country’s trading 
partners, Mi: 
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where σi
fd is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.16   For example, 
the energy product purchased by agents in the model are a composite of imported and domestic 
                                                 
16 This approach follows Armington (1969). 39 
 
energy.  The aggregate imported good, Mi, is itself a CES composite of imports from individual 
countries, Mic, where c is an index indicating the country of origin: 



































The elasticity of substitution between imports from different countries is σi
ff.   
 
  By constraining all agents in the model to have the same preferences over the origin of 
goods we require that, for example, the agricultural and service sectors have the identical 
preferences over domestic oil and imported oil.17  This accords with the input-output data we use 
and allows a very convenient nesting of production, investment and consumption decisions. 
 
In each sector the capital stock changes according to the rate of fixed capital formation 
(Ji) and the rate of geometric depreciation  (δi): 
(4)    k     J   =   k i i i i δ − &  
Following the cost of adjustment models of Lucas (1967), Treadway (1969) and Uzawa (1969) 
we assume that the investment process is subject to rising marginal costs of installation.  To 
formalize this we adopt Uzawa's approach by assuming that in order to install J units of capital a 
firm must buy  a larger quantity, I, that depends on its rate of investment (J/k): 
                                                 
17 This does not require that both sectors purchase the same amount of oil, or even that they purchase oil at all; only 
that they both feel the same way about the origins of oil they buy. 40 
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where φi is a non-negative parameter.  The difference between J and I may be interpreted various 
ways; we will view it as installation services provided by the capital-goods vendor.  Differences 
in the sector-specificity of capital in different industries will lead to differences in the value of φi. 
 
The goal of each firm is to choose its investment and inputs of labour, materials and 
energy to maximize intertemporal net-of-tax profits.  For analytical tractability, we assume that 
this problem is deterministic (equivalently, the firm could be assumed to believe its estimates of 
future variables with subjective certainty).  Thus, the firm will maximize:18 
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where all variables are implicitly subscripted by time.  The firm’s profits, π, are given by: 




i il i i
*
i 2 i − − − −τ π  
where τ2 is the corporate income tax, τ4 is an investment tax credit, and p
* is the producer price 
of the firm’s output. R(s) is the long-term interest rate between periods t and s: 
(8)    r(v)dv  
st
1
  =   R(s)
s
t∫  
                                                 
18 The rate of growth of the economy's endowment of effective labor units, n, appears in the discount factor because 
the quantity and value variables in the model have been scaled by the number of effective labor units.  These 
variables must be multiplied by exp(nt) to convert them back to their original form. 41 
 
Because all real variables are normalized by the economy's endowment of effective labour units, 
profits are discounted adjusting for the rate of growth of population plus productivity growth, n.  
Solving the top tier optimization problem gives the following equations characterizing the firm’s 
behavior: 
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where λi is the shadow value of an additional unit of investment in industry i.   
 
Equation (9) gives the firm’s factor demands for labour, energy and materials and 
equations (10) and (11) describe the optimal evolution of the capital stock.  Integrating (11) 
along the optimum trajectory of investment and capital accumulation,  )) ( ˆ ), ( ˆ ( t k t J , gives the 
following expression for λi: 
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Thus, λi is equal to the present value of the after-tax marginal product of capital in production 
(the first term in the integral) plus the savings in subsequent adjustment costs it generates.  It is 












Thus we can rewrite (10) as: 
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Inserting this into (5) gives total purchases of new capital goods: 
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Based on Hayashi (1979), who showed that actual investment seems to be party driven 
by cash flows, we modify (15) by writing Ii as a function not only of q, but also of the firm's 
current cash flow at time t, πi, adjusted for the investment tax credit: 
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This improves the model’s ability to mimic historical data and is consistent with the existence of 
firms that are unable to borrow and therefore invest purely out of retained earnings. 
 
So far we have described the demand for investment goods by each sector.  Investment 
goods are supplied, in turn, by a third industry that combines labour and the outputs of other 
industries to produce raw capital goods.  We assume that this firm faces an optimization problem 
identical to those of the other two industries: it has a nested CES production function, uses inputs 
of capital, labour, energy and materials in the top tier, incurs adjustment costs when changing its 
capital stock, and earns zero profits. The key difference between it and the other sectors is that 
we use the investment column of the input-output table to estimate its production parameters.   43 
 
B. Households 
We first describe the behaviour of households in the MSG3 model. How this is modified 
to incorporate demographic change in outlined in the following section. Households have three 
distinct activities in the model: they supply labour, they save, and they consume goods and 
services. Within each region we assume household behaviour can be modelled by a 
representative agent with an intertemporal utility function of the form: 
(17)   ds e s g   + s c   =   U t - s -
t
t
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where c(s) is the household's aggregate consumption of goods and services at time s, g(s) is 
government consumption at s, which we take to be a measure of public goods provided, and θ is 
the rate of time preference.19 The household maximizes (17) subject to the constraint that the 
present value of consumption be equal to the sum of human wealth, H, and initial financial 
assets, F:20 
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Human wealth is defined as the expected present value of the future stream of after-tax labour 
income plus transfers: 
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19 This specification imposes the restriction that household decisions on the allocations of expenditure among 
different goods at different points in time be separable. 
20 As before, n appears in (18) because the model's scaled variables must be converted back to their original basis. 44 
 
where τ1 is the tax rate on labour income, TR is the level of government transfers, L
C is the 
quantity of labour used directly in final consumption, L
I is labour used in producing the 
investment good, L
G is government employment, and L
i is employment in sector i.  Financial 
wealth is the sum of real money balances, MON/P, real government bonds in the hand of the 
public, B, net holding of claims against foreign residents, A, the value of capital in each sector: 
(20)   k q + k q + k q + A + B +
p
MON
  =   F
i i
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  Solving this maximization problem gives the familiar result that aggregate consumption 
spending is equal to a constant proportion of private wealth, where private wealth is defined as 
financial wealth plus human wealth: 
(21)  ) ( H + F   =   c pc θ  
However, based on the evidence cited by Campbell and Mankiw (1990) and Hayashi (1982) we 
assume some consumers are liquidity-constrained and consume a fixed fraction γ of their after-
tax income (INC).21  Denoting the share of  consumers who are not constrained and choose 
consumption in accordance with (21) by α8, total consumption expenditure is given by: 
(22)   INC   +   H + F =   c p t t
c γ α θ α ) 1 ( ) ( 8 8 −  
The share of households consuming a fixed fraction of their income could also be interpreted as 
permanent income behaviour in which household expectations about income are myopic. 
 
                                                 
21 There has been considerable debate about the empirical validity of the permanent income hypothesis.  In addition 
the work of Campbell , Mankiw and Hayashi, other key papers include Hall (1978), and Flavin (1981). One side 
effect of this specification is that it prevents us from computing equivalent variation.  Since the behavior of some of 
the households is inconsistent with (21), either because the households are at corner solutions or for some other 
reason, aggregate behavior is inconsistent with the expenditure function derived from our utility function. 45 
 
Once the level of overall consumption has been determined, spending is allocated among 
goods and services according to a CES utility function.
22
  The demand equations for capital, 
labour, energy and materials can be shown to be: 

























where y is total expenditure, xi
c is household demand for good i, σc
o is the top-tier elasticity of 
substitution and the δi
c are the input-specific parameters of the utility function.  The price index 
for consumption, p
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Household capital services consist of the service flows of consumer durables plus 
residential housing.  The supply of household capital services is determined by consumers 
themselves who invest in household capital, k
c, in order to generate a desired flow of capital 
services, c
k, according to the following production function: 
(25)   c k k   =   c α  
where α is a constant.  Accumulation of household capital is subject to the condition: 
(26)   k     J   = k c c c c δ − &  
                                                 
22 The use of the CES function has the undesirable effect of imposing unitary income elasticities, a restriction 
usually rejected by data.  An alternative would be to replace this specification with one derived from the linear 46 
 
We assume that changing the household capital stock is subject to adjustment costs so household 
spending on investment, I
c, is related to J
c by: 

















Thus the household's investment decision is to choose I
C to maximize: 
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where p
ck is the imputed rental price of household capital.  This problem is nearly identical to the 
investment problem faced by firms and the results are very similar. The only important 
differences are that no variable factors are used in producing household capital services and there 
is no investment tax credit for household capital.  Given these differences, the marginal value of 
a unit of household capital, λC, can be shown to be: 
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where the integration is done along the optimal path of investment and capital accumulation, 
)) ( ˆ ), ( ˆ ( t k t J c c .  Marginal q is: 
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and investment is given by: 
                                                                                                                                                             
expenditure system. 47 
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The Labour Market 
We assume that labour is perfectly mobile among sectors within each region but is 
immobile between regions.  Thus, wages will be equal across sectors within each region, but will 
generally not be equal between regions. In the long run, labour supply is completely inelastic and 
is determined by the exogenous rate of population growth.  Long run wages adjust to move each 
region to full employment.  In the short run, however, nominal wages are assumed to adjust 
slowly according to an overlapping contracts model where wages are set based on current and 
expected inflation and on labour demand relative to labour supply.  The equation below shows 
how wages in the next period depend on current wages; the current, lagged and expected values 
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The weight that wage contracts attach to expected changes in the price level is α5 while the 
weight assigned to departures from full employment (L ) is α6.   Equation (32) can lead to short-
run unemployment if unexpected shocks cause the real wage to be too high to clear the labour 
market.  At the same time, employment can temporarily exceed its long run level if unexpected 
events cause the real wage to be below its long run equilibrium. 
The Government 
We take each region's real government spending on goods and services to be exogenous 
and assume that it is allocated among inputs in fixed proportions, which we set to 1996 values.  
Total government outlays include purchases of goods and services plus interest payments on 
government debt, investment tax credits and transfers to households.  Government revenue 48 
 
comes from sales taxes, corporate and personal income taxes, and from sales of new government 
bonds.  In addition, there can be taxes on externalities such as carbon dioxide emissions.  The 
government budget constraint may be written in terms of the accumulation of public debt as 
follows: 
(33)   t t t t t t t T TR G B r D B − + + = = &  
where B is the stock of debt, D is the budget deficit, G is total government spending on goods 
and services, TR is transfer payments to households, and T is total tax revenue net of any 
investment tax credit. 
 
We assume that agents will not hold government bonds unless they expect the bonds to 
be paid off eventually and accordingly impose the following transversality condition:  
(34)   ( ) 0 ) ( lim
) (   =   e s B
s n s R
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− −
∞ →  
This prevents per capita government debt from growing faster than the interest rate forever.  If 
the government is fully leveraged at all times, (34) allows (33) to be integrated to give: 
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Thus, the current level of debt will always be exactly equal to the present value of future budget 
surpluses.23 
 
                                                 
23 Strictly speaking, public debt must be less than or equal to the present value of future budget surpluses.  For 
tractability we assume that the government is initially fully leveraged so that this constraint holds with equality. 49 
 
The implication of (35) is that a government running a budget deficit today must run an 
appropriate budget surplus as some point in the future.  Otherwise, the government would be 
unable to pay interest on the debt and agents would not be willing to hold it.  To ensure that (35) 
holds at all points in time we assume that the government levies a lump sum tax in each period 
equal to the value of interest payments on the outstanding debt.24 In effect, therefore, any 
increase in government debt is financed by consols, and future taxes are raised enough to 
accommodate the increased interest costs. Other fiscal closure rules are possible, such as 
requiring the ratio of government debt to GDP to be unchanged in the long run.  These closures 
have interesting implications but are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Financial Markets and the Balance of Payments 
The eight regions in the model are linked by flows of goods and assets.  Flows of goods 
are determined by the import demands described above.  These demands can be summarized in a 
set of bilateral trade matrices which give the flows of each good between exporting and 
importing countries.    
 
Trade imbalances are financed by flows of assets between countries.  Each region with a 
current account deficit will have a matching capital account surplus, and vice versa.25  We 
assume asset markets are perfectly integrated across regions.26  With free mobility of capital, 
                                                 
24 In the model the tax is actually levied on the difference between interest payments on the debt and what interest 
payments would have been if the debt had remained at its base case level.  The remainder, interest payments on 
the base case debt, is financed by ordinary taxes. 
25 Global net flows of private capital are constrained to be zero at all times – the total of all funds borrowed exactly 
equals the total funds lent.  As a theoretical matter this may seem obvious, but it is often violated in international 
financial data. 
26 The mobility of international capital is a subject of considerable debate; see Gordon and Bovenberg (1994) or 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980). 50 
 
expected returns on loans denominated in the currencies of the various regions must be equalized 








j j k k
&
µ µ + +  
where ik  and ij are the interest rates in countries k and j, µk and µj are exogenous risk premiums 
demanded by investors (calibrated in the baseline to make the model condition hold exactly with 
actual data), and Ek
j is the exchange rate between the currencies of the two countries. 
 
Capital flows may take the form of portfolio investment or direct investment but we 
assume these are perfectly substitutable ex ante, adjusting to the expected rates of return across 
economies and across sectors. Within each economy, the expected returns to each type of asset 
are equated by arbitrage, taking into account the costs of adjusting physical capital stock and 
allowing for exogenous risk premiums. However, because physical capital is costly to adjust, any 
inflow of financial capital that is invested in physical capital will also be costly to shift once it is 
in place.  This means that unexpected events can cause windfall gains and losses to owners of 
physical capital and ex post returns can vary substantially across countries and sectors.  For 
example, if a shock lowers profits in a particular industry, the physical capital stock in the sector 
will initially be unchanged but its financial value will drop immediately. 
Money Demand 
Finally, we assume that money enters the model via a constraint on transactions.27 We use 
a money demand function in which the demand for real money balances is a function of the 
value of aggregate output and short-term nominal interest rates: 
                                                 
27 Unlike other components of the model we simply assume this rather than deriving it from optimizing behavior.  
Money demand can be derived from optimization under various assumptions: money gives direct utility; it is a 51 
 
(37)   i PY   =   MON
ε  
where Y is aggregate output, P is a price index for Y, i is the interest rate, and ε is the interest 
elasticity of money demand.  
The supply of money is endogenously determined given a simple policy rule followed in each 
country. The generic form of the rule is a modified Henderson, McKibbin, Taylor Rule in which 
the short term nominal interest rate 28 depends on the lagged nominal interest rate; a weight on 
the gap between actual and desired inflation; a weight on the gap between actual and potential 
growth. In the more detailed model for some countries we also add a weight on the gap between 
the actual and desired values of the bilateral nominal exchange rate with the United States. 
Assessing the Model 
  All models have strengths and weaknesses and the MSG3 model is no exception.  Its 
most important strength is that it distinguishes between financial and physical capital and 
includes a fully integrated treatment of intertemporal optimization by households, firms and 
international portfolio holders.  This allows the model to do a rigorous job of determining where 
physical capital ends up, both across industries and across countries, and of determining who 
owns the physical capital and in what currency it is valued.  Overall, the key feature of the 
MSG3 model is its treatment of capital, and that is also what most distinguishes it from other 
models in either the macro, trade or CGE literatures. 
The MSG3 model also has other strengths.  All budget constraints are satisfied at all 
times, including both static and intertemporal budget constraints on households, governments 
and countries.  Short-run behaviour captures the effects of slow wage adjustment and liquidity 
constraints, while long-run behaviour is consistent with full optimization and rational 
                                                                                                                                                             
factor of production; or it must be used to conduct transactions.  The distinctions are unimportant for our 
purposes. 
28 See A. Levin, V. Wieland, and J. Williams (1999). 52 
 
expectations.  In addition, wherever possible the model’s behavioral parameters are determined 
by estimation, which is discussed further in Chapter 4 of McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002). 53 
 
9  Appendix II:  Calculating Initial Conditions 
The following appendix outlines the methods used to calculate the initial conditions for human 
wealth and effective labour supply.  The specification of the age-labour profiles implies that 
different amounts of effective labour are supplied by adults of different ages.  Given the age 
composition and the age-labour profile of a population, we can determine the aggregate labour 
supply in an economy.  With additional parameters such as the rate of income tax, the interest 
rate and the mortality rate, we can also calculate the present value of expected lifetime income, 
thereby deriving starting values for human wealth. 
10  Aggregate Labour 
As discussed in the text, individual labour supply, and aggregate labour supply, are given by: 
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For the purposes of generating initial conditions, we assume that there are no people older than 
100 years old, and we discretise the above as: 
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We use a spreadsheet to calculate how much effective labour an adult would supply, at various 
ages, and we create a list of individual labour supply values for ages 16 through to 100 for a 
given year.  Using data on the age composition of the relevant countries, we determine the 54 
 
number of people who are of each particular age in a base year.  To arrive at a figure for 
aggregate labour supply, we take a weighted sum of the individual age-specific labour values.   
11  Human Wealth 
Individual Human Wealth 
As discussed in the paper, individual human wealth is given by: 
(5)    ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 4 3 2 1 t s h t s h t s h t s h t s h + + + =     
where: 
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4   
when lump sum taxes and transfers are zero, as they are in our simulation. 
1.1.1.  Labour Components of Human Wealth 
Starting with the labour components of human wealth (i.e. i=1, 2, 3), we assume that wage and 
the marginal tax rates are constant over time (or that forward looking agents have no reason, at 
the initial point in time, to believe that wages or tax rates will change): 
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So long as r+p+αi>µ, (which is true of our initial parameter values, as well as most other 
reasonable initial parameter values), then: 
(10)  0 lim
) ( ) )( ( =
− − − + −
∞ →
s v i v t v p r
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e e e
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This give us:  
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1.1.2.  Transfer Component of Human Wealth 
When there are no lump sum transfers, no lump sum taxes, and the burden of child support is 
borne equally across the adult population, the non-labour component of human wealth is given 
by: 
(12)   ∫
∞ − + − − =
t
t v p r dv v j e t s h )] ( [ ) , (
) )( (
4   
where j(v) represents the amount each adult must pay as a child support transfer each period: 
(13)  
) ( ) (
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where c(t) represents the amount a child receives, and consumes, each period. 
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In steady state, the dependency ratio will be constant.  Though the economy may not be in steady 
state at our starting point, for the purposes of calculating initial conditions, we make the 
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When r+p>µ, (as they are in our simulations), then: 
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2.  Aggregate Human Wealth 
Aggregate human wealth is given by: 
(18)   ds t s n t s h t H
t
∫ ∞ − = ) , ( ) , ( ) (   
which we use in the discrete form: 
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We evaluate this in a manner similar to that which was used for evaluating aggregate labour 
supply. 































































































































































































































































































PFigure 5 : Implications of a Fertility Decline -Closed Economy versus Open Economy - Theoretical Model





































































































































































































Real and Nominal Exchange Rate



























































































































































































































































PFigure 8 : Implications of a Fertility Decline -Closed Economy versus Open Economy - Symmetric MSG3 Model
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PFigure 11 : Implications of a Stylized Fertility Decline -4 Region MSG3 Model
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Decline in Japanese Fertility:




































*Please see text for Birth Rate definitionFigure 15 (fix)























































































































































































PFigure 17 : Contribution of the Actual and Projected Fertility Decline in Japan -MSG3 Model
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